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Abstract
At some point in the near future, the Supreme Court will weigh in on the
permissible scope of affirmative action to increase workplace diversity. Undoubtedly,
many scholars will argue that if affirmative action is good for colleges and universities, it
is good for workplaces as well. One cannot assess whether this “transplant” argument is
right without understanding the ways in which diversity initiatives at colleges and
universities interact with diversity initiatives at work. The university and the workplace
are not separate and distinct institutional settings in which diversity is or is not achieved.
They are part of an interconnected system. We call this system the “Diversity Loop,” and
it is constituted by three central features: a supply effect (the diversity the university
“supplies” to the labor market), a reiteration effect (the extent to which that diversity can
be “reiterated” into the workplace), and a demand effect (the influence the employer’s
“demand” for particular kinds of employees has on the university’s admissions criteria).
The existence of this Diversity Loop is relevant to the normative question of whether it is
desirable to promote affirmative action in both the workplace and the university settings
and to the doctrinal question of whether the legality of affirmative action in the context of
the workplace should be coextensive with the legality of affirmative action in the context
of the university.
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I. Introduction
By most accounts, the pursuit of racial diversity in the modern elite U.S
workplace is ubiquitous. The extent to which firms genuinely care about achieving it may
be debatable, but assertions of commitment to a diverse workforce have become a
familiar corporate refrain. But does all this routine talk of racial diversity square with the
legal status of workplace diversity initiatives? Arguably there is a tension.1 Given recent
developments,2 it is uncertain whether Title VII permits race-conscious hiring measures
that seek to reap the workplace benefits of racial diversity, especially if such measures do
not fit the mold of traditional affirmative action plans designed to remedy “manifest
imbalances” associated with past discrimination.3
There is little doubt that at some point in the near future, the Supreme Court will
weigh in on this question. In anticipation of that intervention, this article seeks to
understand the significance of workplace affirmative action from a broader, systemic
perspective that scholars have largely overlooked. We step back from the question of
whether employer affirmative action can be doctrinally and theoretically justified by
appeal to the value of diversity and examine, instead, the role affirmative action plays in
shaping workplace diversity. Significantly, our inquiry is not limited to workplace
affirmative action plans: we focus our attention on university affirmative action plans as
well. We do so to investigate the relation between workplace diversity and what we
hypothesize to be a critical determinant: the diversity of the colleges and universities that
feed the employment market. We examine, in short, the causal relation between diversity
in the workplace and diversity in the student bodies of higher educational institutions. We
1

See, e.g., N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, Employer Diversity Initiatives: Legal Considerations (2012)
(describing
the
tension),
available
at
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072272EmploymentDiversityInitiatives.pdf; JOHN SKRENTNY, AFTER CIVIL RIGHTS: RACIAL REALISM IN THE NEW
AMERICAN WORKPLACE (forthcoming 2014) (noting the tension between the practice of diversity and the
formal dictates of Title VII). For a recent study of employer practices relating to workplace diversity, see
Soohan Kim, Alexandra Kalev & Frank Dobbin, Progressive Corporations at Work: the Case of Diversity
Programs, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 171, 205-06 (2012).
2
See especially Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (holding that Title VII does not permit raceconscious action to alleviate racial disparities in the workforce unless employer has “strong basis in
evidence” that failure to take such action would result in liability for disparate impact).
3
See Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara Cnty., 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). For a detailed argument that Ricci contravenes certain key aspects of Johnson
and Weber, see Sachin S. Pandya, Detecting the Stealth Erosion of Precedent: Affirmative Action After
Ricci, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 285, 299 (2010).
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describe this often overlooked relationship to situate race-conscious hiring by employers
in the context of other important systemic factors that contribute to the production of
workplace diversity. Our hope is that the framework we employ will inform the debate
about the legal permissibility of employer affirmative action that is sure to come.
For purposes of the discussion, we assume that it is an open question whether
employers can invoke the value of diversity to justify their affirmative action policies.4
We assume further that, as recently restated by the Supreme Court in Fisher v. University
of Texas,5 the value of diversity can justify a university’s consideration of race as one
factor among many in deciding which applicants to admit.6 Given the accepted value of
diversity in the constitutional setting and the common goals of educational affirmative
action and of Title VII in general,7 many have argued that affirmative action is as
normatively desirable and as necessary in the workplace context as it is in the university.
The thinking is that, because workplaces should be in equipoise with universities with
respect to realizing the benefits of diversity, the normative justifications for diversity and
the policy mechanism for implementing it—affirmative action—should be transplanted
from the educational context to the employment context. 8

4

But cf. Taxman v. Board of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (rejecting
the diversity rationale under Title VII as applied to facts presented), cert. granted, 521 U.S. 1117 (1997),
cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997).
5
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
6
See id. at 2421.
7
See Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
8
See Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative Action in
the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2005). Some scholars frame this argument in terms of
the basic goals of antidiscrimination law, including Title VII—namely, to eliminate racial disparities and
inequalities in the employment context. See id. at 37-38. This entails increasing the numbers of racial
minorities in workplaces where they are underrepresented—i.e., increasing racial diversity in those
contexts. Affirmative action is a sensible way to do that. So if the value of diversity justifies race-conscious
action in the educational context, and if we agree that racial diversity also has positive value under Title
VII, it would seem to follow that race-conscious action should also be justified in the employment context.
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Multiple scholars have endorsed some version of the “transplant” argument.9
Some support their position with reference to the persistence of historical employment
inequalities in the modern workplace. Others highlight the purposes of Title VII. Still
others invoke empirical evidence showing how the presence of diversity can reduce
discriminatory bias and harmful stereotyping.
We do not argue that the transplant approach is mistaken. The benefits of
educational and workplace diversity may indeed be comparable. The problem is that
scholars who justify affirmative action in the workplace by analogy to the educational
context overlook the implications of a crucial fact: the university and the workplace are
not separate and distinct institutional settings in which diversity is or is not achieved.
They are part of a causally connected system.10 This is no small thing. It means that the
policies and practices surrounding diversity in each context shape and influence the
diversity that emerges in the other. Scholars, policy makers, and judges have largely
ignored this crucial dynamic. They continue to frame affirmative action practices in the
workplace and those at colleges and universities as disaggregated diversity mechanisms.
This limits our ability to understand fully what is at stake with respect to overruling
Grutter and/or prohibiting affirmative action in the workplace. In this respect, analyses of
9

See Michael J. Yelnosky, The Prevention Justification for Affirmative Action, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1385
(2003); Katharine T. Bartlett; Making Good on Good Intentions: the Critical Role of Motivation in
Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893 (2009); Kenneth R. Davis, Wheel of
Fortune: a Critique of the “Manifest Imbalance” Requirement for Race-Conscious Affirmative Action
Under Title VII, 43 GA. L. REV. 993 (2009); Tristin K. Green, Race and Sex in Organizing Work:
“Diversity,” Discrimination and Integration, 59 EMORY L.J. 585 (2010); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Note,
Grutter at Work: a Title VII Critique of Constitutional Affirmative Action, 115 YALE L.J. 1408 (2006);
Katherine M. Planer, Comment, The Death of Diversity? Affirmative Action in the Workplace After Parents
Involved, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1333 (2009); Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity,
Integration, and Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2005); Jared M.
Mellott, Note, The Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action in Employment After Grutter: the Case for
Containment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1091 (2006); Anita Bernstein, Diversity May Be Justified, 64
HASTINGS L.J. 201 (2012); Ronald Turner, Grutter, the Diversity Justification, and Workplace Affirmative
Action, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 199 (2005); Corey A. Ciocchetti & John Holcomb, The Frontier of Affirmative
Action: Employment Preferences & Diversity in the Private Workplace, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 283 (2010);
Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: a Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,”
94 CAL. L. REV. 1063 (2006).
10
Significantly, even when scholars point out potential difficulties with the transplant approach, they
generally treat the educational and workplace settings as separate domains of diversity. The question these
scholars then ask is whether diversity really has the same value or function in these two settings and
whether it follows that these different diversity domains should be subject to the same legal constraints.
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diversity-based affirmative action in the employment context or the educational context
are incomplete unless they take into account the consequences that rules permitting or
restricting such action in either domain are likely to have for the system as a whole. We
examine these consequences by way of a model that we call the “diversity feedback
loop.”
Three central features constitute our model: a supply effect, a reiteration effect,
and a demand effect. The schematic below and accompanying texts describe how these
three dynamics combine to create the diversity feedback loop.

5

The basic dynamics are these:
•

The university through its admissions policy assembles a diverse student
body (or not) that on graduation becomes a key supply of labor for
potential employers—a supply effect.

•

The diversity that exists in the supply of labor is at least to some extent
relocated to or “reiterated” in the workplace through the operation of
employer hiring mechanisms—a reiteration effect.

•

The employer’s diversity hiring criteria exert a demand for employees
who have particular characteristics, which can influence the criteria that
universities use to determine the students they admit—a demand effect.

The remainder of the paper elaborates on these dynamics to demonstrate that we
stand a better chance of improving the diversity of universities and workplaces if we
recognize that both domains are part of the same diversity system.11 This insight is
relevant not only as a normative matter (whether it makes sense to promote affirmative
action in both the workplace and the university setting); it is also relevant as a doctrinal
matter (whether the legality of affirmative in the context of the workplace should be
coextensive with the legality of affirmative action in the context of the university).
Our argument unfolds in four parts. Part II discusses the supply and reiteration
effects. These effects follow from the fact that universities are a gateway to the
workplace. Today’s student bodies are tomorrow’s potential workforces. To the extent
that employers rely on universities as a source of labor, universities function as a pathway
through which diversity is supplied. The diversity of the university provides both a limit
on and a template for diversity in the workplace.

11

Justice O’Connor’s argument that affirmative action helps establish a visible path to, and diversity
at the level of, leadership, see Grutter 539 U.S. at 332, is consonant with what we call the supply effect.
See also WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER 128-31 (1998) (discussing reasons
why attendance at a selective university might enhance career opportunities). Our account goes beyond this
insight by modeling how the diversity pathway functions and by showing that this linkage is just one aspect
of the system that connects university and workplace diversity.
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Yet, when employers hire from affirmative action institutions, their own diversityenhancing selection measures might not mirror the measures implemented at the
university admissions stage. Employers in their hiring might seek to realize a conception
of diversity that differs in significant ways from the educationally-rooted ideal of a
diverse student body and actors in these two institutional contexts might therefore
“screen” for diversity in distinctive ways. Part III explores the implications of the
possible divergence between the employer and university diversity screens.
Part IV demonstrates how the hiring practices of employers can influence the
admissions practices of universities in the educational context. Universities operate
within multiple competitive markets. Among other things, they are competing to place
their students with the best employers. Students, in turn, evaluate schools at least in part
based on their placement rates. Universities with poor placement records are at a
competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis those with stronger ones. This creates an incentive for
universities to supply the kind of diversity employers want. Doing so maximizes the
likelihood that employers will hire the graduates of those universities. To the extent that
universities structure their diversity initiatives to maximize the employment opportunities
available to their graduates, the diversity preferences of employers exert a demand on the
university’s admission’s regime. Part IV discusses this demand effect.
II. The Supply and Reiteration Effects
A. The Basic Supply Hypothesis
The Supreme Court recognized long ago that the composition of the relevant labor
market can constrain an employer’s ability to eliminate patterns of racial exclusion from
its workplace.12 Of course, employers who engage in discrimination (or who practice
affirmative action) can cause their workforces to be significantly less or more racially
diverse than the available pool of qualified labor. But the fact remains that the makeup of
that pool places certain limits on the composition of the employer’s workplace. For
12

See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337 n.17 (1977).
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example, if there are no Asian Americans in the labor pool, there will be no Asian
Americans in the workplace, no matter what hiring preferences employers might use.
Employers cannot create workplace diversity out of thin air. They need a supply.
The importance of educational diversity as a source of workplace diversity was
emphasized in an amicus brief filed by Fortune 100 companies in the Fisher case. We
quote directly from the brief:
But amici [Fortune 100 Companies] cannot reach [the] goal [of a diverse
workforce] on their own. … When amici make decisions about hiring and
promotion, it is critical that they be able to draw from a superior pool of
candidates – both minority and non-minority – who have realized the
many benefits of diversity in higher education. There can be no question
that “[t]he Nation’s future” does indeed continue to “depend[] upon
leaders” – including business leaders – “trained through wide exposure to
the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many
peoples.”13
The fact that employers rely on institutions of higher education to provide a supply of
diverse labor implies that the achievement of racial diversity in the workplace will
depend not only the behavior of employers, but also on the behavior of educational
institutions. Thus, workplace diversity is potentially affected by the use of affirmative
action by universities at the admissions stage as well as by employers at the hiring stage.
If this is so, understanding the conditions necessary for achieving workplace diversity
requires isolating the expected effects of race-conscious selection measures at each stage.
To what extent would we expect the diversity of the workplace to be affected by (1) the
use of affirmative action in education and (2) the use of affirmative action by employers?
Our aim here is to provide a theoretical model that provides preliminary answers
to these questions. But first, two specifications are in order. Though we believe that the
model we describe below applies to employers who hire from highly selective colleges
and universities generally, for simplicity, we narrow our focus to law firms who hire their
associates predominantly from highly selective law schools. We will refer to the law
13

Brief for Amici Curiae Fortune-100 and Other Leading American Businesses in Support of
Respondents at 13, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (quoting Bakke, 438
U.S. at 312-13 (Opinion of Powell, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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firms that hire in this way as “elite law firms” and the selective law schools from which
they hire as “elite law schools.” Of course, elite law firms hire from non-elite law
schools, and non-elite firms hire from elite law schools as well. The principal reason we
limit our analysis to the “elite” context is to simplify our analysis, but we note that most
of the literature on racial diversity and law firms focuses on elite law firms, and elite law
firms are more likely to hire from elite law schools than non-elite law schools. Indeed,
there is reason to believe that elite law firms will hire very few people of color from nonelite law schools.14 In this respect, focusing on elite law firms and elite law schools
allows us to track a very real dynamic—the flow of diversity from elite law schools to
elite law firms—and at the same time describe our theoretical hypothesis: namely, that
the diversity of elite law school student bodies is a causal determinant of the diversity of
elite law firm workplaces. This is true simply because whatever diversity exists in elite
law firms has to come from somewhere, and we have stipulated that elite law firms hire
from elite law schools.
The question then becomes: What affects the diversity of elite law schools? One
answer is the school’s admissions policy. The diversity of an elite law school student
body is at least partly determined by that law school’s positive consideration of race as a
factor in admissions, i.e., its affirmative action policy. The more robust the elite law
school’s race-conscious affirmative action program, the more diverse its student body
14

Although elite law firms may do some limited hiring from non-elite law schools, we suspect that for
the most part, that hiring will not include black or Latino students. One explanation for this may be that, for
reasons beyond the scope of this essay, blacks and Latinos may tend to receive lower grades in law school
than their white and Asian American counterparts. Because elite law firms hiring from non-elite law
schools tend to be limited to the very top of the graduating class, blacks and Latinos in non-elite firms
might look proportionally underrepresented in the elite firm workplace were we to define the hiring pool to
include non-elite firms. Such a definition might make our analysis more empirically grounded, but it would
make it difficult for us to model the expected effects of racial diversity in the hiring pool alone, not
confounded by the effects of employer selection for variables unrelated to race.
By limiting the definition of the hiring pool to elite law schools, we can factor out this confounding
variable. While elite law firms may care about the grades of black and Latino students at elite law schools,
their focus tends to be on whether these—and other—elite law school students have met some threshold
level of achievement, not on whether they are at the top of their class. The more “elite” the law school, the
less significant the grades (again, above some threshold of academic performance). Consequently, even if
blacks and Latinos at elite law firms receive lower grades than their white and Asian American
counterparts, they are not outside of the elite law firm’s hiring pool. Thus, by limiting our definition of the
relevant hiring pool to elite law school students, we can factor out the confounding variable of class rank
with a simple (albeit still idealizing) stipulation: law firms are generally indifferent to grades in their hiring
of elite law school graduates.
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will be; and the more diverse a law school’s student body, the more diverse its graduates.
Since elite law firms, by our definition, hire from the labor pool formed by these
graduates, it follows that the use of affirmative action by elite law schools is causally
linked to the racial composition, and hence the diversity, of the workplace of these
employers.15
To summarize, a law school’s admissions regime affects the diversity of the
student body; the diversity of the student body diversity shapes the diversity of the labor
pool; and the diversity of the labor pool impacts the diversity of law firms. These
observations together make up the supply effect in the university-workplace relation.
With this preliminary hypothesis in place, we now model how a legal rule permitting or
restricting race-conscious hiring might modulate the movement of diversity from law
school student bodies to the workplace of the law firm.
B. The Reiteration Effect: Default Case
We begin by establishing what we call a reiteration effect, or the basic tendency
of the level of diversity that exists in the labor supply pool to be reproduced in the
relevant workplace. As a predicate, we make three additional assumptions. First, for
reasons previously discussed,16 we assume that, above some threshold of satisfactory
academic performance, elite law firms are indifferent to grades.17 We further assume that
the diversity of the group of students who achieve this level of academic performance is
the same as the diversity of the student body overall.18 These assumptions imply that
most graduates of elite law schools, including black and Latino students, are regarded by
elite law firms as equally qualified to be hired as associates.19 Third, we assume that the

15

Of course, there are other factors at play. We do not claim that law school affirmative action is the
sole determinant of elite law firm diversity. It suffices for our purposes that it is one significant factor.
16
See supra note 14.
17
For completeness, let us stipulate also that elite law firms generally do not hire students who fall
below that threshold.
18
This assumption likely holds true at the top five or six law schools; for law schools further down in
the rankings, the assumption is likely much more contestable.
19
As discussed above, the purpose of this assumption is to enable us to theorize how workplace
diversity might be affected by the level of racial diversity in law school student bodies and positive
consideration of race (for the sake of creating diversity) by law firms and law schools.
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graduates of all elite law schools who are interested in working in an elite law firm are
equally willing to accept positions in all elite firms, but that any given firm can lure any
particular graduate by offering more pay or expending more resources on recruiting.
Fourth, we assume that the law firm’s and the law school’s conceptions of diversity are
congruent (including judgments about whether a particular individual will contribute to
diversity).20
With these assumptions out of the way, it is helpful to invoke a general axiom
endorsed by the Supreme Court, albeit in the context of a rather different issue.
According to the Court, “absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that
nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less
representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community
from which employees are hired.” 21 This axiom, as applied to our model, suggests that in
the absence of employer discrimination,22 the level of workplace diversity among elite
law firms will, over time, be the same as the level of diversity that exists in the student
bodies of law schools. Whatever diversity exists in elite student bodies will be randomly
supplied to all firms, with no single law firm having a higher or lower level of diversity
than others, except by operation of chance.23
This general axiom might strike some readers as an overly simplistic assumption,
one that flies in the face of empirical evidence about ongoing employment
discrimination. Some might argue that any model that accepts the Court’s assumption in
Teamsters assumes away too much. Two responses are in order. First, if we do not
assume away discrimination, that variable becomes a showstopper for our desired
analysis. If employers are assumed to discriminate, then workplace diversity will be
20

We relax this assumption in Part III below.
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 n.20. The Court was addressing whether intentional discrimination
could be proved through the use of statistical evidence of disparities between the racial composition of the
employer’s workforce and the local labor market.
22
Here we use “discrimination” to refer to actions—implicitly or explicitly motivated—based on bias,
prejudice, or preferences that operate to the disadvantage of racial minorities. We do not count the use of
pro-diversity racial preferences as discrimination. We recognize that this is a contested question in the legal
context of Title VII interpretation.
23
We might add that any observed statistically significant disparities in levels of diversity between
firms could presumptively be attributed to discrimination (either intentional or not) or to positive employer
preferences for diversity.
21
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almost entirely a function of their exclusionary policies—full stop. Thus, we might learn
more about the structural relation between educational and workplace diversity if we
think about what we would expect to happen in the absence of discrimination.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, imagining what we would expect to
happen in the absence of discrimination is a useful exercise because it puts us in a
position to test doctrinal developments on the Supreme Court over the past two decades
that restrict the ability of plaintiffs to bring discrimination claims. While it would be
putting the point too strongly to say that the Court’s jurisprudential default with respect to
employment discrimination is to say that it does not exist, it is fair to say that the federal
courts have not been sympathetic to such claims.24 Our sense is that at least some
members of the Supreme Court would endorse the view that diversity initiatives in the
workplace are not necessary as a corrective for something that is largely no longer a
problem: employment discrimination. The thinking would be that if there is a qualified,
diverse pool of people of color, firms will hire them. Note how this view aligns with the
assumptions of our model—namely, the elite law school’s student body diversity will be
supplied fully and uniformly into the workplace.
In any event, our claim is that in a world in which our basic assumptions holds
true, the racial diversity that exists in the graduating student bodies of elite law schools
will be uniformly distributed among all elite law firms, such that the level of diversity in
the group of students who enter the elite workplace matches the level of diversity in the
elite law student pool overall. In other words, in the default conditions of our model,
workplace diversity simply reiterates student body diversity.

24

See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal
Court: from Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 115 (2009) (arguing that empirical data on low
success rates for employment discrimination plaintiffs “raises the specter that federal appellate courts have
a double standard for employment discrimination cases, harshly scrutinizing employees’ victories below
while gazing benignly at employers’ victories”); see also Kerri Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in Employment
Discrimination Law, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 111, 159-62 (2011) (summarizing recent scholarship discussing
judicial hostility toward employment discrimination claims).
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C. Modeling the Reiteration Effect Under Four Alternative Conditions
If full and uniform reiteration is expected in our model’s default conditions, what
might we expect to observe if we vary both the law firm’s and the law school’s behavior?
That is the question we now take up. We will examine how the supply of diversity from
the law school to the law firm might vary under four specific conditions. Condition I
assumes that the level of law school diversity is high and that the law firm is prohibited
from using affirmative action. Condition II imagines a low level of law school diversity;
here, too, the law firm may not use affirmative action. Condition III permits the law firm
to use affirmative action and posits a high level of law school diversity. Under Condition
IV, the law firm is also permitted to use affirmative action but the level of law school
diversity is low. We discuss below how each of these conditions might affect the supply
of student body diversity from the university (the law school) to the workplace (the law
firm).
Condition I: High Educational Diversity, Employer Affirmative Action Prohibited.
Suppose that there is a high level of racial diversity in the student bodies of elite
law schools, such that the presence of racial minorities in these student bodies is as high
as or higher than in the general population. (We might imagine a world in which all elite
law schools were permitted under applicable state and federal law to consider the race of
their applicants as a positive factor in the admissions process, and all elite law schools did
in fact do so.) Stipulate also that law firms are not legally permitted to take race into
account in their hiring decisions, i.e., that the law requires formally colorblind hiring.
What result should be expected, given the assumptions of our model, for law firm
diversity?
Assuming full compliance by law firms, we should expect that, over time, all elite
law firms would come to have the same high level of diversity that is present in elite law
school student bodies. That is to say, the diversity of the student bodies will be fully and
uniformly supplied to the workplace. To understand why, recall that we are assuming for
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purposes of analysis that there is no explicit or implicit discrimination in the labor
market. Insofar as firms are not going to differentiate among elite students (per our earlier
hypothesis and explanation), we should expect student body diversity to be supplied to
and be randomly distributed among all elite law firms. We would also expect that, over
time, every elite law firm would mirror the demographic of the elite law school student
bodies from which they are populated. In short, under Condition I, workplace diversity
would be established at levels matching the diversity of the student pool even without the
utilization of employer affirmative action.
Condition II: Low Educational Diversity, Employer Affirmative Action Prohibited.
In this condition, suppose that elite universities have low levels of racial diversity,
such that the proportion of racial minorities in their student bodies is significantly lower
than their proportion in the general population. This scenario could emerge in a
jurisdiction (like California) that prohibits the consideration of race in university
admissions; the scenario could also occur if, at some future point, the Supreme Court
overruled Grutter and held that affirmative action was unconstitutional in the educational
context. Assume, as in Condition I, that the law prohibits race-conscious affirmative
action hiring. What result?
As in Condition I, we should expect that, under Condition II, over time, all elite
workplaces will come to share the demographic of the student bodies from which they
draw. That is, all law firms will come to have an equally low level of racial diversity. A
formally colorblind hiring rule, again assuming non-discrimination, should reproduce the
level of diversity present in the elite student body pool at the workplace level of the law
firm. If the level of diversity in the overall pool of job candidates is low, then colorblind
hiring should produce an equally low level of workplace diversity, uniformly distributed
among firms.

14

Condition III: High Educational Diversity, Employer Affirmative Action Permitted.
In the third condition, stipulate that there is a high level of diversity in elite law
school student bodies, as in Condition I. But now suppose that employers are permitted
(but not required) to consider job applicants’ membership in a minority racial group as a
positive factor in their hiring decisions, if doing so is reasonably necessary to create or
maintain diversity in the workplace.25 What outcomes should we expect? The short
answer: roughly the same level and distribution of workplace diversity as in Condition I,
the condition with high diversity in the labor market and no affirmative action.
This might seem counterintuitive. One might think a rule permitting consideration
of race for diversity purposes would lead to variances among law firms in their levels of
diversity. But remember that firms are only permitted to employ affirmative action “if
reasonably necessary” to ensure diversity. Since we stipulate in Condition III that there is
a high level of diversity in the pool of available candidates, and given our overall
assumption that this labor market is free of explicit or implicit forms of discrimination
and biases, employers should not need to take race into account to yield meaningful
diversity. A sufficiently high level of diversity in the pool of available candidates should,
under formally colorblind hiring, be adequate to supply that same level of diversity
uniformly across all law firms. Assuming that employers are aware of the racial
demographics of the pool, it is reasonable to conclude that they would see little need to
engage in affirmative action hiring and would refrain from doing so.26 Combining the
results from Conditions I and III, we can conclude that in conditions of high diversity in
the available pool of job candidates, we should not expect overall levels or the
25

The qualification in our hypothetical rule permitting consideration of race only if “reasonably
necessary” is not based on current Title VII law; but if the Supreme Court were to recognize a diversitybased justification for affirmative action in hiring, the Court would surely impose some limitation of this
sort, if not an even more restrictive one.
26
In Condition III, if an elite firm mistakenly believes that consideration of race is necessary for
workplace diversity, the firm will end up with a level of diversity that is either equal to or higher than the
level of diversity in the pool of available students. If the firm’s pro-diversity hiring results in a level of
diversity that is equal to that in the pool, then the firm’s “unnecessary” consideration of race should have
no effect on the overall distribution of diversity among firms. If the firm, as a result of its positive
consideration of race, produces a higher level of diversity in its own workplace than is present in the overall
applicant pool, this might tend to cause an increased level of diversity relative to the firms that perceive
(correctly, according to our assumptions) that consideration of race is not necessary.
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distribution of workplace diversity across law firms to be significantly dependent on
whether or not employers are permitted to take race into account as a positive hiring
factor for the sake of diversity.
Condition IV: Low Educational Diversity, Employer Affirmative Action Permitted.
Our final condition assumes that there is a low level of racial diversity in the
student bodies of elite law schools. Recall that this is also the case in Condition I.
Stipulate now that, as in Condition III, law firms are permitted (but not required) to
consider job applicants’ race as a positive factor in their hiring decisions. The caveat,
again, is that they may do so only if reasonably necessary to create or maintain diversity
in the workplace. Under this condition, what should we expect vis-à-vis the overall
supply and distribution of diversity in the workplace?
The results will depend on the extent to which law firms give positive weight to
race in their hiring decisions. If law firms behave uniformly, then the results of Condition
IV should be the same as Condition II (the condition with low education diversity,
employer affirmative action prohibited). There are two ways in which employers could
act uniformly.
First, all law firms might refrain from using affirmative action. This would render
Condition IV indistinguishable from Condition II, so the same results should follow.
Second, all law firms could decide to practice affirmative action. Under the default
assumptions of our model, elite law firms are all on equal footing in terms of the likely
success of their diversity initiatives. Thus, a university’s student body diversity would be
supplied uniformly to all elite workplaces. The overall level of resultant law firm
diversity will also likely be uniform.27
27

One might think that the answer would depend on the ratio of elite students in the available labor
pool to available positions. If there are at least as many employment positions available as there are elite
students looking for jobs, then the uniform application of affirmative action preferences by employers
should not disrupt the full and uniform propagation of the low level of diversity that exists in the elite
student pool to the workplace. However, if there are fewer employment positions available than elite
students in the pool, affirmative action will cause minority workers to be hired at a greater rate than non-
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But now let us imagine that elite firms have different views regarding the
importance of establishing diversity in their workplaces. Assume that some firms give
high priority to having a diverse workforce, while other firms care less about diversity as
such, or are committed to an ideal of formally colorblind hiring. Suppose, in other words,
that only some elite firms consider race as a positive consideration (call these “prodiversity” firms) while other firms do not take race into consideration at all (call these
“colorblind firms”). Under these additional assumptions, what result should we expect for
workplace diversity among elite firms?
In our model, the amount of diversity in the elite law school student body pool
limits the diversity that can be reiterated into the workplace, so we should expect the
overall level of diversity among all elite firms to be about as low as that observed in the
candidate pool. But unlike in previous conditions, we would expect the distribution of
that diversity to be non-uniform across firms. Pro-diversity firms, insofar as they see a
greater value in establishing workforce diversity, will offer higher salaries or expend
more recruiting resources to lure job candidates who would enhance or bolster the firm’s
diversity profile. Colorblind firms, who by definition care less about diversity or are
ideologically committed to colorblindness, would have no reason to make the extra
expenditures necessary to attract the diversity candidates away from pro-diversity firms
and so would be less likely to attract and hire them. Over time, therefore, pro-diversity
firms will come to have a higher level of workplace diversity than colorblind firms. As
student body diversity continues to cluster in pro-diversity firms from year to year, prodiversity firms will eventually achieve a level of diversity that is higher than the level of
diversity available in the elite student body pool, and colorblind firms will eventually
have a level of diversity that is even lower than the already-low level available in the
candidate pool.
minority workers, which will result in a level of workplace diversity that is higher than the level of
diversity in the candidate pool. In this case, the argument might go, the diversity would not only propagate
to the workplace, but would also be amplified. While this is theoretically possible, it seems equally possible
that in conditions of job scarcity, employers would either consciously or unconsciously scale back their
affirmative action hiring so as not to exceed a certain “saturation” point for workplace diversity. If so, then
there would be no amplification effect.
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It may not seem particularly remarkable that in Condition IV, pro-diversity firms
will come to achieve more workplace diversity than colorblind firms, but there are two
less obvious points that bear mentioning. First, Condition IV is the only one of the four
conditions in which we would expect anything other than a uniform distribution of
diversity across all hiring firms. In all other conditions, including Condition II, in which
we stipulated that employers are permitted to engage in pro-diversity hiring, we would
expect the diversity of the workplace to be the same as the diversity of the relevant labor
pool. Second, a comparison of Conditions II and IV shows that where the diversity of the
available candidate pool is very low, then an employment rule that permits but does not
require pro-diversity hiring will tend to result in a lumpy distribution of diversity among
hiring firms, such that some firms will come to have high levels of diversity, while other
firms will have minimal or no diversity. In contrast, an employment rule that requires
colorblind hiring in conditions of low labor market diversity will tend to produce an even,
albeit low, level of diversity among all hiring firms.
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D. Summary
The table below summarizes the results of the preceding four conditions.
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The following five conclusions flow from these results. First, even when one takes into
account the diversity practices of firms—that is, whether they engage in or refrain from
using affirmative action hiring—the diversity of law school student bodies (the diversity
supply) remains crucial to the analysis. Second, a similar point can be made with respect
to law: Whatever the governing legal regime with respect to whether employers are
permitted to use affirmative action, the diversity of university student bodies will play an
important role in shaping the diversity of the workplace. These two points highlight the
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importance of affirmative action in the educational domain. It is a significant mechanism
through which diversity is supplied to the labor market.
This brings us to our third point: There are only two ways in our model to achieve
high diversity in all elite workplaces. One is to ensure high diversity in elite student
bodies. The other is to induce all law firms to engage in affirmative action in conditions
of job scarcity (creating an amplification effect).
Fourth, the results of Condition I might lead one to conclude that we should
jettison affirmative action in the employment context if we have robust affirmative action
in the educational context. The latter will necessarily be supplied to the former. That is
indeed the story our theoretical model tells. But a limitation of our model is that we
assume away discrimination in the marketplace. If we add discrimination back into the
model—and not necessarily invidious discrimination but simply implicit bias—the results
under Condition I would change. Firms whose decision-making reflects implicit bias
would have a lower level of diversity than firms whose decision-making does not reflect
this bias. For many proponents of affirmative action, this is precisely what affirmative
action is designed to counteract—biases (implicit and explicit) in the labor market.
Fifth, understanding the foregoing limitation of our model is especially important
in light of the Supreme Court’s commitment to colorblindness and general judicial
skepticism about workplace discrimination.28 This is a point we made earlier but bears
emphasizing here. Condition I is, for us, decidedly theoretical. However, for the
conservative justices on the Court, Condition I might be an assumed reality. That has
implications for the future of affirmative action in the context of the workplace. If a
majority of the Supreme Court concludes that workplace discrimination is a thing of the
past, it could conclude that, even if affirmative action is necessary in the context of
university admissions to achieve student body diversity, it is unnecessary in the context
of the workplace, because the diversity of the student body would be reiterated into the
workplace.
28

See Stone, supra note 25, at 159-62.
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Our sixth and final conclusion is this: In low educational diversity conditions,
rules that permit pro-diversity hiring will likely result in racial clustering, and law firms
will separate themselves over time into high-diversity and low-diversity workplaces.29
This has implications for jurisdictions like California that prohibit state universities from
engaging in affirmative action. Some employees might find themselves in law firms in
which there is meaningful diversity; most will not. Still, to the extent that having
meaningful diversity in some workplaces (Condition IV) is better than having low
diversity across all workplaces (Condition II), we should ensure that the prohibition of
affirmative action in the context of education is not extended to the context of
employment.
III. Divergent Diversity Screens: Complicating the Reiteration Dynamic
In modeling the supply of diversity from elite law schools to elite law firms in
Part II, we assumed that law firms and law schools share a common notion of “diversity.”
This need not be the case. A law firm might employ very different criteria than law
schools. Law schools are admitting students to service multiple markets, including the
public interest markets. As a general matter, these students are likely to be more racially
conscious with respect to both their sense of selves and their normative commitments
more generally. Moreover, as academic institutions, law schools will likely seek to admit
at least some students who they think will stir things up and facilitate the robust exchange
of ideas.
Law firms, on the other hand, may want very different kinds of diversity. Their
corporate market context will presumably shape the kind of—and how much—diversity
they pursue. For example, while law firms are prohibited from invoking customer
preferences to justify screening their application pool for racially palatable African
Americans, it is hard not to imagine that some firms end up (at least implicitly) doing just
that.
29

We say this is likely in our model, not certain, because clustering would not occur if all employers
act in perfect unison with respect to their permitted use of pro-diversity preferences.
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To recognize that law schools and law firms do not necessarily employ the same
diversity screens is not to say that their diversity initiatives must be regarded as
autonomous. Indeed, we claim the opposite. For one thing, law firms and law schools
might actually employ precisely the same diversity criteria (e.g., looking for people who
will facilitate racial cooperation and understanding), in which case we might say that
their screens expressly converge. For another, even when law firms and law school
diversity criteria do not expressly converge in this way, the diversity that actually arises
in each context could nevertheless appear to converge on a shared conception.
Suppose, for example, that law firms care more than law schools about weeding
out individuals with poor teamwork attributes. One might assume that this might cause
law firm diversity to diverge from law school diversity. That is possible. But on the other
hand, law firms might find that the experience of a diverse elite law school prepares
students of all backgrounds to work productively and harmoniously in heterogeneous
social settings. If this were true, even law firms that prioritize teamwork might be happy
to accept, without much further screening, whatever type of diversity law schools
produce. The general point is that if law firms perceive value in the diversity produced by
law schools, they might seek to capitalize on that value by reproducing it in their
workplaces.
Finally, law school and law firm diversity initiatives are not autonomous in
another way; any diversity criteria the law firm utilizes at the hiring stage will necessarily
piggyback on the diversity efforts of the law school at the admissions stage. As argued
above, the diversity of law schools creates the diversity of the labor pool from which law
firms hire.
While keeping in mind these ways in which law school and law firm diversity
initiatives are connected, we turn our focus in this Part to how law school and law firm
initiatives can diverge. To appreciate how law firm and law school diversity screening
can diverge and the implications of that divergence for the reiteration effect, let us call
the set of minority individuals who are the beneficiaries of affirmative action at the law
school admissions stage “Law School Diverse” or “LS-Diverse” individuals. And let us
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call the set of minority individuals who are beneficiaries at the law firm hiring stage
“Law Firm Diverse” or “LF-Diverse” individuals. Some minorities might be both LSDiverse and LF-Diverse, while others might be neither.
Consider the ways in which the set of LS-Diverse individuals might relate to LFDiverse individuals: Quantitatively, the LF-Diverse group could be larger than, smaller
than, or the same size as the LS-Diverse group. Qualitatively, the LF-Diverse group could
overlap the LS-Diverse group in whole, in part, or not at all. These various possibilities
could be combined in a large number of ways. We will not attempt to march through all
of the permutations, but a few comments are in order.
There are various reasons why the set of people who are the beneficiaries of LFDiversity initiatives might be different from those who previously benefitted from LSDiversity initiatives. The two sets might be quantitatively different simply because
universities and employers give different weight to racial considerations in the selection
process. A heavier weighting will naturally tend to result in a larger set of individuals
who benefit from the diversity initiative.
There might also be systemic reasons that could explain quantitative divergence
between LS-Diversity and LF-Diversity. For example, if law schools engage in robust
affirmative action measures and succeed in creating highly diverse student bodies, who
then form the labor pool from which law firms hire, law firms might perceive that there is
less of a need for them to use pro-diversity affirmative action in order to achieve
significant workplace diversity. They may assume, per our discussion in Part II, that the
diversity in the labor market will naturally “trickle up” or be reiterated into the firm. This
might be especially true of firms that conceive of themselves as non-discriminatory.
These firms would see little need to employ affirmative action as a prophylactic against
the possibility of discrimination. Under this scenario, the set of people who benefit from
LF-Diversity efforts may be low relative to the set of people who benefit from LSDiversity efforts.
Law firm and law school affirmative action initiatives might also yield different
sets of beneficiaries for reasons having to do with the context dependent nature of
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diversity initiatives. LF-Diversity might be qualitatively different from LS-Diversity.
Employers and universities might look for different characteristics in constructing their
institutional diversities. Employers might, for example, screen candidates for
compatibility with their corporate culture in ways that constrain their pro-diversity
hiring.30 In some cases, what might appear to be facially neutral screening criteria might
cause LF-Diversity selections to be negatively correlated with LS-Diversity selections. A
silly example: a law firm might screen in favor of minority candidates who, in addition to
attending elite law schools, attended prestigious private prep schools. But minority law
students with prep school backgrounds might be less likely than others to have benefited
from affirmative action at the law school admissions stage – i.e., less likely to be LSDiverse. If so, then law firm screening for minorities who attended prestigious private
prep schools could cause LF-Diversity to be negatively correlated with LS-Diversity.
Law firm diversity and law school diversity might diverge in other ways. Elite
law firms and elite law schools might have different ideas about the characteristics (in
addition to simple racial phenotype) that could make one person preferable to another
from the standpoint of enhancing the institution’s diversity. The basic educational goals
and academic principles that define the mission of elite universities (of which elite law
schools are a part) do not apply to most elite employers.31 The value of diversity in the
educational context, or at least the value that has been assigned constitutional
significance, encompasses a well known mélange of goods, including enhanced
educational discourse, eradication of racial stereotypes and other types of de-biasing,
reduction of racial isolation, preparation for citizenry in a pluralistic society, providing
good modeling for minority youth, create a visible path for minorities leading to
leadership roles in society, and so on.32 Against the background of these interests, a law
school might make special efforts to enroll students from racial minority groups who are
30

For purposes of this discussion, we still assume, as in Part II, that employers regard all graduates of
elite universities as comparably qualified for positions in their workplaces, but we introduce the possibility
that employers might consider characteristics other than objective qualifications in constructing their
workforce.
31

See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419 (stating that “[t]he academic mission of a university is ‘a special
concern of the First Amendment’” (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (1978)).
32

See generally Devon W. Carbado, Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1130 (2013).
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most likely to bring an overtly “racial perspective” to classroom discussions, which might
include minority students who have the least in common with most other students with
respect to their backgrounds and experiences, in order to activate Bakke/Grutter discourse
benefits.
Law firms might also have an interest in fostering diverse perspectives in the
workplace on a different basis, such as the belief that this would improve its ability to
anticipate client or customer needs. But, overriding concerns about workplace harmony
might make employers wary of hiring individuals who will have trouble fitting into the
corporate culture.33 This does not mean that these institutions would seek individuals who
dis-identify with their race or embrace a colorblind sense of self. Increasingly, corporate
cultures are interested in establishing so-called “affinity groups,” that is, groups that are
organized around specific identities (such as, being gay or lesbian, a person of color, or a
woman). While these groups are less prevalent in the law firm context, elite law firms are
still interested in hiring people of color who will perform palatable or modest forms of
racial diversity work. The point is that it will be the rare elite law firm that would hire an
African American because that African will shake up the firm’s institutional culture. This
is precisely the kind of person an elite law school might admit.
More generally, the benefits that law schools as academic institutions might seek
to advance will not necessarily readily map onto the priorities of a typical (non-academic)
employer’s workplace. To be clear: This is not to say that law firms will perceive no
value in diversity. The point, instead, is that even when they perceive positive value in a
diverse workforce they may have different reasons than law schools for doing so.
A final reason that law firm diversity screens might be different from law school
diversity screens is that the employer may be hiring from a pool that has already been
made diverse through affirmative action at an earlier screening stage (the admissions
process). This fact may have varying implications. One possibility is that a law firm
might make fine distinctions between minority individuals within the pool who may have
33

Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.
J. 1757 (2003) (book review) (surveying the literature on the extent to which corporate workplaces are
often structured to achieve homogeneity).
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been equal beneficiaries of pro-diversity admissions criteria. It might do so, for example,
in order to screen out individuals whom it perceives would clash with its corporate
culture.
Much of the foregoing is speculative. That should not obscure that our analysis is
theoretically grounded in the fact that law firms and law schools operate under different
incentive systems with respect to their pursuit of diversity. The difference in their
incentive structures means that elite law firms may utilize different diversity-screening
criteria than law schools.
IV. The Demand Effect
In Part III, we explored the implications of law firms and law schools employing
different diversity screens. We assumed that these diversity-promoting criteria are stable
over time and that they are independently fixed within each context. In this Part, we relax
the latter assumptions to explore the possibility that universities might adjust their
admissions policies in response to observed employment patterns, including employers’
revealed preferences about the kind of diversity they want.
Elite law firms operate in a competitive market. While their primary mission may
be educational and academic, they compete with each other to attract exceptional students
who will enrich the community, perform to the highest academic standards, and make
valuable contributions to society after they graduate. One way in which law schools
attract students is by trying to outperform their peer institutions in placing their graduates
in the most desirable jobs. If they are unable to compete with other law schools in
achieving placement of graduates on the job market, the best students will decide to
matriculate elsewhere, which will erode the affected universities’ prestige and academic
standing, eventually making it difficult for them to maintain their status among their elite
peers. The fact that placement rates figure significantly in the overall ranking of law
schools makes this dynamic all the more significant.
The competition to place graduates in desirable jobs gives rise to an incentive for
universities to admit more of the types of students who are sought by employers when
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they graduate, and fewer of the types of students who are not.34 Law schools may have
multiple reasons to admit or not admit a particular type of student. In general, to the
extent that employers actively seek graduates who possess some discernible set of
characteristics, universities will have an added incentive to look for those characteristics
in the students they admit. If law firms tend not to hire graduates with some set of
characteristics, then law schools will have less reason to admit applicants fitting that type.
There is no reason that this demand effect should not apply to characteristics
associated with enhancing workplace diversity. If elite law firms give priority in their
hiring to elite law school graduates who possess diversity-enhancing characteristics, law
schools will have an added incentive to screen in favor of those characteristics at the
admissions stage. That is to say, other things equal,35 law schools have an incentive to
adopt admissions criteria that tend to produce LF-Diverse graduates. The demand exerted
by employers for graduates meeting their diversity criteria could cause law firm diversity
initiatives and law school diversity initiatives to converge over time.36 Whether this
occurs likely will depend on the strength of the law firm’s diversity demand37 and the
strength of the incentive for the law school to respond to this demand.38
34

Significantly, law schools are very much aware of where their students end up. For at least the past
two decades, largely because of law school rankings, but also to facilitate alumni relationships and giving,
law school have been keeping fairly accurate records about where the graduates end up.
35
We readily concede that other things may not be equal. For example, if LF-Diversity is insufficient
to fully activate the educational benefits that might be possible with other modes of diversity, then
universities might give priority to achievement of those educational benefits even at the cost of marginally
lower employment of graduates. But our point is that employer demand for a particular type of diversity
will exert a pull in that direction, not that the value of LF-Diversity will necessarily trump all other law
school values.
36

We would not predict complete convergence because satisfying employer demand is only part of
(and concededly, perhaps only a small part of) the educational benefit of a diverse student body. See
discussion in Part III above.
37
At least two factors could shape the strength of this demand: the law firm’s substantive commitment
to diversity and the employer’s symbolic commitment to diversity. With respect to the substantive
commitment, an employer might be committed to diversity because it thinks (a) it’s the right thing to do,
(b) diversity will improve workplace efficiency and productivity, and (c) provides access to markets. With
respect to the symbolic commitment, an employer might simply want to signal (“showcase”) diversity to
avoid the reputational costs of not doing so.
38
The strength of this incentive would turn on (a) how important employment rankings are to the
overall ranking of the institution, (b) how much attention students pay to employment rates and/or rankings,
and (c) whether jobs are scarce. As to the scarcity of jobs, we note that in conditions of full employment,
the demand effect will be weak, unless employers actively avoid hiring students who are LS-Diverse – a
possibility that is factored out by our initial assumptions of Part II. The demand effect will be most
pronounced when law firms implement diversity initiatives in conditions of job scarcity. In those
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V. Conclusion: Some Implications of our Model
Our point of departure was the claim that the diversity of law schools and of law
firms are intertwined. What happens in one setting impacts the other. We then moved on
to show some of the specific ways in which the two contexts interact, including a
discussion of how law firm diversity initiatives might modulate the flow of diversity from
law schools to law firms, and how those initiatives might in turn loop back to influence
the behavior of law school admissions committees. We conclude by suggesting several
implications of our account for the development and promotion of workplace diversity.
First, the existence of diversity in the supply of labor that feeds into the
employment market is a necessary condition of workplace diversity. Workplace diversity
cannot be created from thin air. And insofar as law school student body diversity depends
on educational affirmative action, it follows that educational affirmative action is a
necessary condition of workplace diversity. In other words, in addition to constituting a
law school’s entering class, law school admissions constitute the future law firm
application pool from which law firms hire.
Second, there is a quantitative and a qualitative dimension to this supply function.
Quantitatively, the more aggressively pro-diversity the law school’s admissions criteria,
the more diverse the hiring pool. Qualitatively, the stronger the convergence between the
kind of diversity in which a law firm is interested and the kind of diversity a law firm
seeks to advance, the greater the likelihood that the law firm will rely on the law school’s
graduates as its employment pool and thus the greater the likelihood that the law school’s
diversity will be reiterated into the law firm.
Third, by and large, we ought not worry about law schools engaging in “too
much” affirmative action. Few worry about his concern with respect to law firms on the
view that law firm behavior in this regard will be disciplined by the competitive markets
in which they operate. But the same goes for the behavior of universities. Diversity
initiatives in the educational context are, after all, voluntary. Universities have no reason
conditions, LF-Diverse students will be hired at a disproportionately higher rate than all other students,
giving rise to an incentive for law schools to admit more students fitting that profile.
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to engage in affirmative action beyond a level that balances educational usefulness with
whatever demand for diversity actually exists in the employment market.
Finally, we should query whether the story we tell about the demand effect means
that law firms may be exerting too much pressure on law schools to conform their
conception of diversity to the model that happens to prevail in the workplace. Law
schools might have good reasons to offer admission to the iconoclastic, overtly racialized
student with a penchant for challenging hierarchy and complacency with the status quo.
Law firms might be more reticent in offering that student a job—and that might affect the
law school’s willingness to offer admission.
Similarly, law firms and law schools might have a very different sense of how
much diversity is enough. “Critical mass” from a law firm’s perspective might look very
different from “critical mass” from the perspective of the law school—and the former
might end up shaping the latter. To put this another way, if law firms have a diversity
saturation point or a diversity ceiling, law schools have an incentive to adjust their
affirmative action efforts to keep the diversity of their student bodies below that level.
The concern, in short, is that the demand effect can influence both the quantitative and
the qualitative supply of diversity throughout the loop. This suggests that we ought to
begin a conversation about whether there are ways to effectuate a counterbalancing force
so that a law school’s quantitative and qualitative commitments to diversity are not only
shaped by, but also shape how law firms articulate their vision of a diverse workplace.
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